I am a Senior Economist in the Financial Studies Unit at the Central Bank of Chile. I hold a PhD in Economics from Tilburg University.
My research covers financial intermediation and labor markets. On the financial side, I ask how lending relationships transmit liquidity and information across banks, and how central bank collateral policy affects the structure of financial markets. On the labor side, I ask how firms use flexible contracts to adjust over the business cycle, and how this adjustment changes aggregate fluctuations. My empirical work uses administrative microdata from Chile and the Netherlands.
Email: jcarreno@bcentral.cl
Working Papers
- Flexible Jobs in Macroeconomic Stabilization, Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publications
- Flexible Labor Contracts, Firm-Specific Pay, and Wages (with Burak Uras and Harry Huizinga), European Economic Review (forthcoming)
- Decomposing the Finance Wage Premium: Contributions of Technology and Risk (with Burak Uras, Ata Can Bertay, Harry Huizinga and Nathanael Vellekoop), 2026, Journal of Corporate Finance
- Macro Welfare Effects of Flexible Labor Contracts (with Burak Uras), 2024, European Economic Review
- Banks’ Interconnections and Peer Effects: Evidence from Chile (with Rodrigo Cifuentes and Paula Margaretic), 2021, Research in International Business and Finance
- Identifying Complex Core-Periphery Structures in the Interbank Market (with Rodrigo Cifuentes), 2017, Journal of Network Theory in Finance
- The Chilean Peso Exchange-Rate Carry Trade and Turbulence (with Paulo Cox), 2017, CEPAL REVIEW
- The Interbank Market in Chile: Network Structure and Evolution Over Time (with Rodrigo Cifuentes), 2016, Economia Chilena
Work in Progress
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Collateral Policy, Supervisory Learning, and Systemic Risk (with Guillermo Ordoñez)
Abstract
When a central bank accepts claims on banks as collateral without pricing issuer risk, banks pledge claims from the smallest and riskiest banks first. We use daily security-level portfolios of all Chilean banks around the Central Bank of Chile's 2019 decision to accept bank bonds and deposits. We present suggestive evidence that this adverse selection is ex-post informative. Relative to their own past performance and to the least pledged issuers, the most pledged issuers later perform worse, with lower financial returns, less capital, and more non-performing loans. However, the information comes with interconnections. Eligibility raises the price of bank-issued claims by about 1 percent as banks demand more of them, and it makes the interbank network denser, less concentrated, and more reciprocal, with shorter paths between banks. Gross and net exposures to other banks, measured as interbank claims over capital, rise sharply too. -
Flexibility, Technology and Wages in a Dual-Contract Labor Market (with Chang-Tai Hsieh, Burak Uras and Harry Huizinga)
Abstract
The conventional case for restricting flexible employment is that flexible workers are concentrated at low-productivity firms, so any expansion of flexible contracts disproportionately benefits those firms. This argument treats average employment shares as sufficient statistics for marginal hiring decisions. We show that it is not. Using matched employer-employee data for the universe of Dutch workers over 2006–2019, we show that although low-productivity firms have higher shares of flexible contracts, most of the growth in flexible employment over the sample period occurred at highly productive firms. We rationalize these facts with a model in which convex organizational costs of permanent employment generate a employment-mix elasticity strictly decreasing in permanent workforce size. We show that restricting flexible contracts mainly constrains the most productive firms rather than protecting workers from low-productivity employers.